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StratQuad

Ransomware: the first 24 hours

3 min read

The decisions and actions that determine the outcome of a ransomware incident, in the order they usually arise.

At a glance

Owner
StratQuad
Version
November 2026
Applies to
Any organisation responding to suspected or confirmed ransomware
Mandatory
Guidance

Key points

  • Contain without destroying evidence: isolate affected systems from the network; do not power them off or wipe them.
  • Assume identity is compromised. Most ransomware operators hold domain or cloud administrator access before they encrypt.
  • Protect backups and the identity platform first, because they are what you will recover with.
  • Move coordination to communication channels the attacker cannot see.
  • Start the regulatory, insurance and law enforcement clocks early; the data protection 72 hours often begins on day one.

Hour 0 to 1: contain and mobilise

  1. Declare an incident and name an incident lead with authority to take systems offline.
  2. Isolate, do not power off. Disconnect affected hosts from the network, or isolate them through endpoint detection and response. Memory and running processes hold evidence that is lost on shutdown.
  3. Cut attacker access paths: disable VPN and remote access for all but named responders, block known malicious infrastructure, and suspend accounts showing malicious activity.
  4. Protect backups: confirm backup systems and their credentials are separate from the compromised domain; take an offline or immutable copy out of reach if one is not already.
  5. Open an out of band channel: a phone bridge and messaging on devices and accounts not joined to the compromised environment.
  6. Call your insurer and incident response retainer. Many policies require their panel firm.

Practitioner note

The single most expensive early mistake is rebuilding or restoring before you know how the attacker got in and what they still hold. Restored systems rejoin a domain the attacker controls and are encrypted again. Contain first, scope second, recover third.

Hour 1 to 4: scope

  • Identify patient zero and the access route: exposed remote access, exploited edge device, phishing, or stolen credentials, often bought from an initial access broker.
  • Map encryption: which systems, which data, which business services.
  • Look for exfiltration: large outbound transfers, archive tools, and file transfer utilities in the days before encryption. Most groups steal data before encrypting it.
  • Identify the group from the ransom note, file extension and leak site. Known groups have documented tactics, decryptor availability and sanctions status.
  • Assess identity: domain controllers, Entra ID or other identity providers, privileged accounts, and newly created accounts or persistence such as scheduled tasks and remote management tools.

Hour 4 to 24: decide and notify

  • Notification decisions

    Personal data breach assessment (72 hour clock); NIS or sector regulator duties; NCSC; Report Fraud or Police Scotland; DSPT for health and care; contractual notifications. See Reporting a cyber incident in the UK.

  • Identity recovery

    Reset privileged credentials from a clean device, reset the Kerberos KRBTGT account password twice, waiting at least the maximum ticket lifetime (10 hours by default) between resets, revoke cloud sessions and tokens, and review conditional access and app registrations.

  • Recovery plan

    Prioritise systems by business impact, rebuild from known good images, restore data only from backups confirmed to predate the compromise, and monitor rebuilt systems closely.

  • Communications

    A holding statement for staff, customers and the public; one spokesperson; no speculation about attribution or data loss until confirmed.

  • Payment position

    Record the board's position early. Check sanctions exposure with legal advisers; paying a sanctioned person is an offence. The NCSC and National Crime Agency advise against payment, and payment does not guarantee deletion of stolen data.

Evidence expected

Preserve: memory captures and disk images from representative affected hosts; firewall, VPN, identity provider, EDR and email logs, exported before retention expires; the ransom note and any communications; and a time stamped decision log. Insurers, regulators and any later legal proceedings rely on these.

Common mistakes

Common mistakes

  • Powering off servers, losing volatile evidence.
  • Discussing the response on email or chat inside the compromised tenant.
  • Restoring before the access route is closed, leading to re encryption.
  • Resetting user passwords while leaving attacker controlled privileged accounts, tokens and persistence in place.
  • Treating "no data leaked yet" as "no data stolen".

Sources

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