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StratQuad

Microsoft 365 security baseline

3 min read

The tenant settings that stop the most common Microsoft 365 compromises, in priority order.

At a glance

Owner
StratQuad
Version
November 2026
Applies to
Organisations using Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Entra ID
Mandatory
Guidance; parts are required by Cyber Essentials (multi factor authentication on cloud services)

Key points

  • Identity is the perimeter. Most Microsoft 365 compromises start with stolen credentials or session tokens.
  • Enforce multi factor authentication for every user through Conditional Access, and phishing resistant methods for administrators and high risk roles.
  • Separate, minimise and time limit administrative rights; keep at least two emergency access accounts excluded from blocking Conditional Access policies and monitored.
  • Restrict user consent to applications, which is a common persistence route.
  • CISA's SCuBA baselines and Microsoft Secure Score give testable, versioned settings to measure against.

Identity

  • MFA for all users enforced through Conditional Access, not per user settings. Cyber Essentials requires MFA on cloud services where available.
  • Phishing resistant methods (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys, Windows Hello for Business, certificate based authentication) required for administrators, finance, HR and executives.
  • Block legacy authentication, which cannot perform MFA.
  • Require compliant or hybrid joined devices for access to sensitive data, which limits stolen session reuse.
  • Sign in and user risk policies where licensing allows, requiring reauthentication or blocking on high risk.
  • Restrict MFA registration to trusted conditions, so an attacker with a password cannot register their own method.

Privileged access

  • Use dedicated, cloud only administrator accounts with no mailbox, separate from daily accounts.
  • Assign the least privileged role that does the job; keep Global Administrators to a small number.
  • Use Privileged Identity Management for just in time role activation where licensing allows.
  • Keep at least two cloud only emergency access ("break glass") accounts protected by phishing resistant methods that differ from normal administrator accounts, excluded from Conditional Access policies that block or restrict sign in, with alerts on any sign in.

Applications and data

  • Restrict user consent to applications from verified publishers with low risk permissions, or require admin approval.
  • Review enterprise applications and app registrations for high privilege permissions such as Mail.ReadWrite or full access as application.
  • Set external sharing for SharePoint and OneDrive to the minimum the business needs, and expire anonymous links.

Email

  • Publish DMARC at quarantine or reject for your domains, with SPF and DKIM aligned.
  • Block automatic forwarding to external domains by default.
  • Enable anti phishing, Safe Links and Safe Attachments where licensed, and tag external email.

Logging and detection

  • Confirm the unified audit log is on and retained for as long as investigations need; standard retention may be shorter than your incident response requires.
  • Send sign in, audit and alert logs to your SIEM.
  • Alert on new inbox rules, external forwarding, MFA method changes, role assignments and consent grants.

Practitioner note

Start with Conditional Access in report only mode, review the impact for a week, then enforce. The settings that cause outages are device compliance and legacy authentication blocks, usually because of service accounts and old multifunction printers; find those first. Measure progress against CISA's SCuBA baselines with its ScubaGear assessment tool rather than against Secure Score alone, which rewards some low value actions.

Evidence expected

For audit or assurance, export: Conditional Access policies with their assignments and exclusions; the list of privileged role holders; authentication methods policy; consent settings; external sharing settings; audit log retention; and a recent baseline assessment report.

Common mistakes

Common mistakes

  • Conditional Access policies with broad exclusion groups that quietly grow.
  • Security defaults turned off without equivalent Conditional Access policies enforced, leaving neither in place.
  • Administrators using their daily account, with a mailbox, for privileged work.
  • Users allowed to consent to any application.
  • Audit log retention shorter than the time it takes to detect a compromise.

Sources

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