At a glance
- Owner
- StratQuad
- Version
- November 2026
- Applies to
- Any organisation that owns a domain, whether or not it sends email from it
- Mandatory
- Guidance; required by Google, Yahoo and Microsoft for bulk senders, and by many public sector and supplier contracts
Key points
- SPF lists the servers allowed to send for your domain, DKIM signs each message, and DMARC tells receivers what to do when neither passes in alignment with the visible From address.
- Only DMARC at
p=quarantineorp=rejectstops direct spoofing of your domain. SPF and DKIM on their own do not. - Roll out in stages: publish DMARC at
p=nonewith reporting, fix every legitimate sender, then move to quarantine and reject. - DMARC is now a Proposed Standard, RFC 9989, published in May 2026. It removes the
pcttag and addsnp,tandpsd. Existingv=DMARC1records still work. - Domains that never send email need records too, or they are the easiest ones to spoof.
- NCSC retired Mail Check on 31 March 2026. Aggregate report processing is now each organisation's own responsibility.
How the three fit together
Spoofed email abuses the address a person sees in their mail client, the From: header. SPF and DKIM each authenticate a different domain, and neither checks the visible From address by itself. DMARC closes that gap by requiring at least one of them to pass and to match the From domain. That match is called alignment.
| Record | Lives at | What it proves | What it does not do |
|---|---|---|---|
| SPF | TXT at the domain used in the SMTP envelope (Return-Path) | The sending server is authorised for the envelope domain | Check the visible From address; survive forwarding |
| DKIM | TXT at selector._domainkey.example.co.uk | The message was signed by the domain in the d= tag and has not been altered | Say anything about mail that is not signed |
| DMARC | TXT at _dmarc.example.co.uk | SPF or DKIM passed for a domain aligned with the From address | Stop lookalike domains such as examp1e.co.uk |
A message passes DMARC if either aligned SPF or aligned DKIM passes. DKIM matters more in practice: it survives forwarding, and SPF does not.
SPF
An SPF record lists the IP addresses and services allowed to send mail using the domain in the SMTP envelope.
example.co.uk. TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.example-esp.com -all"
- One record only. Two
v=spf1records on the same name is a permanent error, and SPF fails for every message. - Ten DNS lookups at most.
include,a,mx,ptr,existsandredirecteach count, including lookups nested inside included records. Exceeding ten is a permanent error (RFC 7208, section 4.6.4). Each new marketing or ticketing platform adds lookups, so this is the most common way SPF breaks. - End with
-allor~all.-all(fail) is clearer.~all(softfail) is acceptable once DMARC is enforcing, because DMARC decides the outcome. Never publish+all, which authorises every server on the internet. - Avoid
ptr. The RFC discourages it, it is slow, and some receivers ignore it.
Practitioner note
Third party senders such as payroll, CRM and marketing platforms often send with their own envelope domain. SPF then passes for their domain, not yours, and does not align. Ask each supplier to sign with DKIM using your domain, or to use a custom return path on a subdomain you control. That is the usual way to get those messages passing DMARC.
DKIM
DKIM adds a cryptographic signature to each message. The receiving server fetches the public key from DNS using the selector named in the signature.
selector1._domainkey.example.co.uk. CNAME selector1-example-co-uk._domainkey.example.onmicrosoft.com.
- Key length. RFC 8301 requires RSA keys of at least 1024 bits and recommends 2048. Use 2048 wherever the platform allows it.
- One selector per sending service. Separate selectors let you rotate or revoke one supplier's key without touching the others.
- Rotate keys. Microsoft 365 publishes two selectors for this. Other platforms vary. Check before rotating that the old selector is no longer in use.
- Sign with your domain. A signature from the platform's own domain (
d=esp.example) passes DKIM but does not align with your From address.
DMARC
DMARC publishes your policy for mail that fails aligned authentication, and asks receivers to report back to you.
_dmarc.example.co.uk. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]"
| Tag | Meaning |
|---|---|
p | Policy for the domain: none (monitor only), quarantine (treat as suspicious, usually junk) or reject |
sp | Policy for subdomains that exist, if different from p |
np | Policy for subdomains that do not exist in DNS (new in RFC 9989) |
rua | Where aggregate reports are sent |
ruf | Where failure reports are sent. Many large receivers do not send them, for privacy reasons |
adkim, aspf | Alignment mode: r (relaxed, the default) allows subdomains to align with the organisational domain; s (strict) requires an exact match |
t | Test mode flag (new in RFC 9989), replacing the use of pct for staged rollout |
What changed in RFC 9989
Changes from RFC 7489 (2015, Informational) to RFC 9989 (May 2026, Proposed Standard)
- Standards track. DMARC moves from an informational document to a Proposed Standard. Aggregate reporting is now RFC 9990 and failure reporting RFC 9991.
pctremoved. Applying a policy to a percentage of failing mail produced inconsistent results. Thettag replaces it for testing.rfandriremoved. Both were rarely used.npandpsdadded.npsets the policy for non existent subdomains.psdmarks records published by public suffix operators.- Tree walk. Receivers now find the organisational domain by walking up the DNS tree, instead of using the Public Suffix List.
- Same version tag. Records still begin
v=DMARC1. Existing records keep working, but removepctwhen you next edit the record.
Rolling out to reject
- Inventory senders. List every system that sends as your domain: the mail platform, CRM, marketing, payroll, ticketing, finance, scanners and printers, and website forms.
- Publish
p=nonewithrua. Collect aggregate reports for at least two to four weeks so monthly and quarterly senders show up. - Fix each legitimate sender. Add it to SPF within the lookup limit, or better, enable DKIM signing with your domain.
- Move to
p=quarantine. Watch the reports and the service desk for a further few weeks. - Move to
p=reject. Setsp=rejectunless a subdomain has a documented reason to differ. - Keep reading reports. New suppliers appear without notice. A sender that starts failing after reject goes quietly undelivered.
Note
NCSC retired Mail Check on 31 March 2026, and its free DMARC aggregate reporting had already ended in March 2025. Organisations that relied on it need their own report processing: a commercial DMARC service, the tooling in their email platform, or an open source parser. NCSC's Check your cyber security service still checks email anti spoofing for small organisations.
Domains that do not send email
Parked, defensive and legacy domains are spoofed precisely because nobody watches them. Publish these records on every domain that never sends mail:
example.org.uk. TXT "v=spf1 -all"
_dmarc.example.org.uk. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject"
example.org.uk. MX 0 .
The final record is a null MX (RFC 7505). It tells other mail servers the domain accepts no mail, so they fail quickly instead of retrying.
Protecting mail in transit
SMTP between mail servers uses opportunistic TLS by default. An attacker positioned on the path can strip the STARTTLS offer and read mail in clear text.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) publishes a policy, through a TXT record and an HTTPS hosted file, telling sending servers to require TLS with a valid certificate when delivering to you. Start in
testingmode, then move toenforce. - TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) asks sending servers to report TLS delivery failures to you. Deploy it with MTA-STS so a certificate problem shows up before mail is lost.
_mta-sts.example.co.uk. TXT "v=STSv1; id=20261108"
_smtp._tls.example.co.uk. TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:[email protected]"
The policy file is served at https://mta-sts.example.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Mailbox provider requirements
The largest mailbox providers now make authentication a condition of delivery.
| Provider | Applies to | Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Google (Gmail) | From February 2024, senders of more than 5,000 messages a day to personal Gmail accounts | SPF and DKIM, DMARC at p=none or stronger with alignment, one click unsubscribe for marketing mail, and a low reported spam rate |
| Yahoo | From February 2024, bulk senders | Broadly the same as Google |
| Microsoft (Outlook.com, Hotmail, Live) | From 5 May 2025, senders of more than 5,000 messages a day | SPF, DKIM and DMARC at p=none or stronger with alignment. Non compliant mail is rejected with 550 5.7.15 |
These are minimums for deliverability, not a security target. Only quarantine and reject protect your recipients from spoofing.
Common mistakes
Common nonconformity
- Leaving DMARC at
p=noneindefinitely. It produces reports but stops nothing. - Two SPF records, or an SPF record over the ten lookup limit, which fails every message silently.
- Suppliers sending with their own DKIM domain, so mail fails alignment the day the policy moves to reject.
sp=noneleft in place, so attackers spoofinvoices.example.co.ukinstead of the main domain.- No records on non sending domains.
ruareports sent to a mailbox nobody reads.- Treating DMARC as protection against lookalike domains. It does not stop
examp1e.co.uk; domain monitoring and user awareness are needed for that, as covered in Business email compromise and payroll fraud response.
Check your domain
The StratQuad domain check reads your email authentication records from public DNS and explains each finding. It is passive: it reads DNS and sends no email.
Sources
- NCSC. Email security and anti-spoofing (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 7208: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 6376: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 8301: Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Usage Update to DKIM (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 9989: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 8461: SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 7505: A "Null MX" No Service Resource Record (opens in a new tab)
- NCSC. NCSC to retire Web Check and Mail Check (opens in a new tab)