At a glance
- Owner
- StratQuad
- Version
- November 2026
- Applies to
- Any organisation with a public website or domain
- Mandatory
- Guidance; TLS and secure configuration are expected under Cyber Essentials, the CAF and most supplier security questionnaires
Key points
- DNS is the root of trust for everything else. Lock the registrar account and enable DNSSEC; a broken DNSSEC chain takes a domain offline, which is worse than not signing at all.
- CAA records limit which certificate authorities may issue for your domain.
- Serve TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only. Public certificates are limited to 200 days from March 2026, falling to 47 days by 2029, so certificate renewal has to be automated.
- Redirect HTTP to HTTPS and send HSTS. Join the preload list only when every subdomain can serve HTTPS permanently.
- A small set of response headers blocks whole classes of attack. Content Security Policy is the most valuable and the hardest to get right.
- Remove DNS records that point at services you no longer use, or someone else can claim them.
DNS and the registrar
Whoever controls your DNS controls your website, your email and your certificates. Most domain hijacks start at the registrar account, not in DNS itself.
- Registrar account. Use a role mailbox, phishing resistant MFA and a named owner. Turn on registrar lock (and registry lock for critical domains, where offered) so transfers and nameserver changes need extra verification.
- Expiry. Turn on auto renew and record expiry dates in the asset register. An expired domain can be registered again by anyone, along with the email that still points at it.
- Inventory. List every domain you own, including parked and defensive ones, with its registrar, DNS host and owner.
DNSSEC
DNSSEC signs DNS answers so a resolver can detect forged responses. It needs two parts: the zone is signed at your DNS host, and a DS record at the registrar links the parent zone to your key.
- Most managed DNS providers sign zones with one setting and give you the DS record to publish.
- A broken chain is an outage. If the DS record at the registrar no longer matches the key in the zone, validating resolvers return SERVFAIL and the domain disappears for a large share of users. This usually happens after moving DNS provider without removing or updating the DS record first.
Practitioner note
When moving DNS provider, remove the DS record at the registrar and wait for its TTL to expire before switching nameservers. Then sign the zone at the new provider and publish the new DS record. Doing these steps in the wrong order is the most common cause of a DNSSEC outage.
CAA
A CAA record (RFC 8659) names the certificate authorities allowed to issue certificates for the domain. Authorities must check it before issuing.
example.co.uk. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
example.co.uk. CAA 0 issuewild ";"
example.co.uk. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:[email protected]"
issuelists the authorities allowed to issue.issuewildcontrols wildcard certificates separately;";"forbids them.iodefgives an address for reports of refused requests. Support among authorities varies.- Include every authority you really use: your CDN, your hosting platform and any managed certificate service. Some CDNs add their own CAA entries automatically. Check the published record rather than assuming.
Dangling records and subdomain takeover
A CNAME pointing at a cloud service you have deleted, such as an app service, storage bucket or SaaS custom domain, can often be claimed by someone else on the same platform. They then serve content, and sometimes set cookies, on your subdomain.
Review DNS whenever a service is decommissioned, and periodically against the asset inventory. Certificate transparency logs (searchable at crt.sh) show every hostname a public certificate has been issued for, and are a quick way to find subdomains people have forgotten.
TLS and certificates
- Protocols. Serve TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 were formally deprecated by RFC 8996 in 2021, and current browsers refuse them.
- Ciphers. On TLS 1.2, use forward secret AEAD suites (ECDHE with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305). TLS 1.3 removes the weak options itself.
- Certificate chain. Serve the full intermediate chain. A missing intermediate works in some browsers and fails in others, so it is easy to miss in testing.
- Lifetimes are shrinking. Under CA/Browser Forum ballot SC-081v3, the maximum validity of public TLS certificates fell to 200 days on 15 March 2026. It falls to 100 days in March 2027 and 47 days in March 2029. Renewal by hand stops being viable; use ACME or your platform's managed certificates.
HTTPS redirect and HSTS
Every HTTP request should redirect permanently (301 or 308) to HTTPS on the same host. HSTS (RFC 6797) then tells browsers to use HTTPS only for that host, for a set period, so a later downgrade cannot strip TLS.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Start with a short
max-agewhile you confirm every subdomain serves HTTPS, then raise it to at least a year. includeSubDomainscovers every subdomain, including internal ones reached by browser. Check before adding it.
Preloading builds HSTS into browsers, so even the first visit is protected. hstspreload.org requires a valid certificate, an HTTP to HTTPS redirect on the same host, HTTPS on every subdomain, and a header on the base domain with max-age of at least 31536000, includeSubDomains and preload.
Note
Preloading is hard to reverse. Removal can take months to reach browsers through updates, and other browsers are not guaranteed to follow. Preload only domains where every subdomain will serve HTTPS for the long term.
Security headers
| Header | Recommended value | What it prevents |
|---|---|---|
Content-Security-Policy | A policy listing allowed sources for scripts, styles, frames and connections, including frame-ancestors | Cross site scripting, injected third party scripts, clickjacking |
X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff | Browsers treating uploaded files as scripts |
X-Frame-Options | DENY or SAMEORIGIN | Clickjacking in older browsers; frame-ancestors in CSP replaces it |
Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin or stricter | Leaking full URLs, which may contain tokens, to other sites |
Permissions-Policy | Disable features the site does not use, such as camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() | Embedded content using powerful browser features |
X-XSS-Protection is obsolete. Omit it or set it to 0; the old filter it controlled could itself be abused.
Practitioner note
Deploy CSP with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only first and collect violation reports for a few weeks. Tag managers, analytics and chat widgets usually produce the most violations. A policy that relies on 'unsafe-inline' for scripts gives little protection against cross site scripting; move towards nonces or hashes instead.
Cookies, scripts and mixed content
- Cookie flags. Session cookies should carry
Secure,HttpOnlyandSameSite=LaxorStrict. The__Host-name prefix also stops a subdomain overwriting the cookie. - Subresource Integrity. Scripts and stylesheets loaded from third party CDNs should include an
integrityhash, so a compromised CDN cannot change them without the browser refusing to run them. - Mixed content. An HTTPS page that loads scripts or frames over HTTP undoes its own TLS. Browsers now upgrade or block most of it, but it still shows up in old templates and CMS content.
security.txt
A security.txt file (RFC 9116) at /.well-known/security.txt tells researchers how to report a vulnerability. It needs a Contact and an Expires field, and should be renewed before it expires. It costs nothing, and researchers who find no route to report tend to post publicly instead.
Common mistakes
Common nonconformity
- Changing DNS provider with DNSSEC enabled and the old DS record still at the registrar.
- A CAA record that omits the authority the CDN or hosting platform actually uses, so the next automated renewal fails.
includeSubDomainsor preload added before checking that every subdomain serves HTTPS.- Certificate renewal that depends on someone remembering, which will not survive 100 and 47 day lifetimes.
- A CSP copied from another site, either too loose to protect anything or so strict it breaks forms and payments.
- DNS records left pointing at deleted cloud services.
- Treating a good external grade as proof the site is secure. These settings are hygiene; application vulnerabilities need penetration testing and secure development practices.
Check your domain
The StratQuad domain check reports on DNSSEC, CAA, TLS, HSTS, security headers, cookie flags, Subresource Integrity, mixed content and dangling CNAME records using public DNS and ordinary web requests. How the domain check works explains each check and how it is graded.
Sources
- IETF. RFC 8659: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 6797: HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 8996: Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 (opens in a new tab)
- Chromium. HSTS preload list submission (opens in a new tab)
- CA/Browser Forum. Ballot SC-081v3: Introduce schedule of reducing validity and data reuse periods (opens in a new tab)
- OWASP. HTTP security headers (opens in a new tab)
- IETF. RFC 9116: A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure (security.txt) (opens in a new tab)