At a glance
- Owner
- National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
- Version
- CAF 4.0
- Published
- 6 Aug 2025
- Applies to
- Operators of essential services, UK government departments, NHS bodies, local government and other organisations whose regulator or sponsor adopts it
- Mandatory
- Mandatory where a regulator or sponsor requires it (NIS Regulations, GovAssure, DSPT); voluntary otherwise
- Assessed by
- Self assessment, reviewed by the regulator or sponsor; independent assessment under GovAssure and DSPT
- Cost model
- Free to use
Key points
- Four objectives, 14 principles and 41 contributing outcomes.
- Each contributing outcome is rated Achieved, Partially achieved or Not achieved, using Indicators of Good Practice as aids to judgement, not a checklist.
- CAF 4.0, published 6 August 2025, adds outcomes on understanding the threat (A2.b) and secure software development and support (A4.b), and reworks detection under C1.
- Regulators and sponsors set which outcomes must be achieved through CAF profiles. The framework itself sets no pass mark.
- It is the assessment basis for the NIS Regulations, GovAssure and the CAF aligned Data Security and Protection Toolkit.
What it is
The CAF assesses whether an organisation is managing cyber risk to its essential functions: the services or operations whose disruption would cause serious harm. It is written as outcomes rather than controls. It states what good looks like and leaves the organisation to choose how to achieve it.
It was created for the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations 2018 and is now used well beyond them: across central government through GovAssure, by NHS England through the CAF aligned Data Security and Protection Toolkit, and by local government.
Structure
The framework has four objectives. Each objective contains principles, and each principle contains contributing outcomes. Contributing outcomes are the unit of assessment.
AManaging security riskA1Governance 3A1.aBoard DirectionA1.bRoles and ResponsibilitiesA1.cDecision making
A2Risk Management 3A2.aRisk Management ProcessA2.bUnderstanding ThreatA2.cAssurance
A3Asset Management 1A3.aAsset Management
A4Supply Chain 2A4.aSupply ChainA4.bSecure Software Development and Support
BProtecting against cyber attackB1Service Protection Policies, Processes and Procedures 2B1.aPolicy, Process and Procedure DevelopmentB1.bPolicy, Process and Procedure Implementation
B2Identity and Access Control 4B2.aIdentity Verification, Authentication and AuthorisationB2.bDevice ManagementB2.cPrivileged User ManagementB2.dIdentity and Access Management
B3Data Security 5B3.aUnderstanding DataB3.bData in TransitB3.cStored DataB3.dMobile DataB3.eMedia and Equipment Sanitisation
B4System Security 4B4.aSecure by DesignB4.bSecure ConfigurationB4.cSecure ManagementB4.dVulnerability Management
B5Resilient Networks and Systems 3B5.aResilience PreparationB5.bDesign for ResilienceB5.cBackups
B6Staff Awareness and Training 2B6.aCyber Security CultureB6.bCyber Security Training
CDetecting cyber security eventsC1Security Monitoring 6C1.aSources and Tools for Logging and MonitoringC1.bSecuring LogsC1.cGenerating AlertsC1.dTriage of Security AlertsC1.ePersonnel Skills for Monitoring and DetectionC1.fUnderstanding User and System Behaviour, and Threat Intelligence
C2Threat Hunting 1C2.aThreat Hunting
DMinimising the impact of cyber security incidentsD1Response and Recovery Planning 3D1.aResponse PlanD1.bResponse and Recovery CapabilityD1.cTesting and Exercising
D2Lessons Learned 2D2.aPost Incident AnalysisD2.bUsing Incidents to Drive Improvements
How outcomes are rated
Each contributing outcome has a table of Indicators of Good Practice (IGPs) in up to three columns:
| Rating | What the IGPs describe | How the CAF says to use them |
|---|---|---|
| Achieved | Typical characteristics of full achievement | Normally all are true, unless compensating measures meet the outcome another way |
| Partially achieved | Partial achievement that still delivers a specific, worthwhile security benefit | Not available for every outcome |
| Not achieved | Typical characteristics of failure | Any one is normally enough to justify this rating |
The CAF is explicit that IGPs support expert judgement and are not an exhaustive or rigid checklist. An assessor can rate an outcome Achieved where the organisation meets its intent by a route the IGPs do not describe.
What changed in CAF 4.0
Changes from CAF 3.2 to CAF 4.0
- A2.b Understanding Threat (new). Requires an understanding of threat actors' capabilities and intent against the essential function. Threat analysis indicators move here from A2.a, and Assurance is renumbered from A2.b to A2.c.
- A4.b Secure Software Development and Support (new). Covers secure, supported software, including provenance, testing, patching and attestation of authenticity, whether developed in house or by suppliers.
- A4.a Supply Chain. Expanded indicators on supplier security and contractual obligations.
- Detection reworked. C1.a becomes Sources and Tools for Logging and Monitoring, C1.d becomes Triage of Security Alerts, C1.e becomes Personnel Skills for Monitoring and Detection, and threat intelligence indicators move into C1.f.
- Automated decision making. A new indicator under B4.a addresses restrictions on automated decision making technologies that could adversely affect essential functions. NCSC describes this as broader coverage of AI related risk.
- Language. "Attacker" becomes "threat actor" across many outcomes, and descriptions refer to security and resilience.
Profiles and who sets the bar
The CAF does not say how many outcomes must be Achieved. That is set by whoever uses it:
- NIS competent authorities set expectations for operators of essential services in their sector.
- GovAssure defines Baseline and Enhanced CAF profiles for government departments, chosen by the criticality of each system.
- NHS England maps the CAF to the Data Security and Protection Toolkit and specifies which outcomes each organisation type must meet.
Practitioner note
Before any assessment, get the profile in writing. A Partially achieved rating on an outcome the profile expects to be Achieved is a gap to remediate; the same rating on an outcome outside the profile may be entirely acceptable. Assessments that skip this step tend to produce long lists of "gaps" the organisation was never required to close.
How it is assessed
- Define the scope. Identify the essential functions and the networks and information systems they depend on. CAF ratings attach to that scope, not to the whole organisation.
- Self assess. For each contributing outcome, rate against the IGPs and record evidence.
- Review or independent assessment. Depending on the regime, the regulator, an independent assessor or both review the self assessment.
- Improvement plan. Gaps against the profile go into a plan with owners and dates, which the regulator or sponsor tracks.
Evidence expected
Assessors look for operating evidence, not policy alone: board minutes showing cyber risk decisions (A1), a current threat assessment for the essential function (A2.b), an asset inventory that includes dependencies and data flows (A3.a), supplier security requirements in contracts (A4.a), privileged access reviews (B2.c), patching metrics against defined timescales (B4.d), tested backup restores (B5.c), alert triage records (C1.d), and exercise reports with tracked actions (D1.c).
Common gaps
Common nonconformity
- Essential functions not defined, so scope is "everything" and evidence never lines up with ratings.
- A2.b rated Achieved on the strength of a subscription to a threat feed, with no analysis of what it means for the essential function.
- Logging in place but no defined triage process or skilled staff to act on alerts, which now fails C1.d and C1.e explicitly.
- Backups that exist but have never been restored under test conditions (B5.c).
- Incident response plans that are not exercised, or exercises whose lessons are never tracked to closure (D1.c, D2.b).
Relationship to other frameworks
The CAF overlaps heavily with ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, but is not interchangeable with either. ISO/IEC 27001 certifies a management system; the CAF assesses outcomes for specific essential functions; NIST CSF is a voluntary outcome taxonomy without an assessment scheme. Cyber Essentials covers a small subset of principles B2 and B4. For control level mappings, use OpenCRE.