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NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0

4 min read

A voluntary taxonomy of cybersecurity outcomes, organised into six Functions, used to describe, prioritise and communicate cyber risk management.

At a glance

Owner
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Version
CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)
Published
26 Feb 2024
Applies to
Any organisation, of any size, in any sector or country
Mandatory
Voluntary; required by policy for some US federal bodies and contracts
Assessed by
Self assessment; no certification scheme exists
Cost model
Free to use

Key points

  • Three components: the CSF Core (outcomes), Organizational Profiles (current and target state) and Tiers (rigour of risk governance).
  • The Core has six Functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover, with 22 Categories and 106 Subcategories.
  • Govern is new in 2.0 and includes cybersecurity supply chain risk management.
  • It describes outcomes, not controls. Implementation Examples and Informative References point to how and to related standards.
  • There is no certification. "NIST CSF compliant" claims describe a self assessment.

What it is

The CSF gives organisations a common language for cyber risk outcomes. It is used to assess current capability, set a target state, prioritise the gap, and report to boards and regulators in a structure that is recognised internationally.

Version 2.0 was published on 26 February 2024. It widened the stated audience from critical infrastructure to all organisations, added the Govern Function, and moved supporting material such as Implementation Examples and Quick Start Guides into online resources that NIST updates separately from the core document.

The CSF Core

Each Function contains Categories, and each Category contains Subcategories. Subcategories are referenced by identifiers such as GV.OC-01 or PR.AA-05.

  • GVGovern
    • GV.OCOrganizational Context
    • GV.RMRisk Management Strategy
    • GV.RRRoles, Responsibilities, and Authorities
    • GV.POPolicy
    • GV.OVOversight
    • GV.SCCybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
  • IDIdentify
    • ID.AMAsset Management
    • ID.RARisk Assessment
    • ID.IMImprovement
  • PRProtect
    • PR.AAIdentity Management, Authentication, and Access Control
    • PR.ATAwareness and Training
    • PR.DSData Security
    • PR.PSPlatform Security
    • PR.IRTechnology Infrastructure Resilience
  • DEDetect
    • DE.CMContinuous Monitoring
    • DE.AEAdverse Event Analysis
  • RSRespond
    • RS.MAIncident Management
    • RS.ANIncident Analysis
    • RS.COIncident Response Reporting and Communication
    • RS.MIIncident Mitigation
  • RCRecover
    • RC.RPIncident Recovery Plan Execution
    • RC.COIncident Recovery Communication

Govern sits across the other five Functions: it sets the context, strategy, roles, policy and oversight within which the rest operate.

Profiles and Tiers

Organizational Profiles describe an organisation's posture in terms of the Core.

  • A Current Profile records the outcomes the organisation achieves today and how.
  • A Target Profile records the outcomes it intends to achieve, prioritised by risk.
  • A Community Profile is a baseline published for a sector or use case, which organisations can adopt as, or adapt into, a Target Profile.

The gap between Current and Target Profiles drives an action plan.

Tiers characterise the rigour of an organisation's cybersecurity risk governance and management practices:

TierNameIn practice
1PartialAd hoc, reactive, limited awareness of cyber risk at organisational level
2Risk InformedRisk management practices approved by management but may not be established as organisation wide policy
3RepeatablePractices formally approved as policy, applied consistently and updated
4AdaptivePractices adapt to changing threats and lessons learned, and cyber risk is part of the organisational culture

Practitioner note

Tiers are not a maturity score for each Subcategory, and Tier 4 is not a target for everyone. NIST says organisations can choose to use Tiers to inform their Profiles, and encourages moving to a higher Tier only where risks or mandates are greater or a cost benefit analysis supports it. Reporting a single "maturity number" per Function on a 1 to 4 scale is a common local convention, not part of the framework, so say so when you present it.

What changed in 2.0

Changes from CSF 1.1 to CSF 2.0

  • Govern Function added, drawing together governance outcomes previously spread across Identify, and adding supply chain risk management as GV.SC.
  • Scope widened from critical infrastructure to all organisations; the title dropped "for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity".
  • Core restructured: categories were merged and renumbered, Identify gained ID.IM Improvement, and Protect was reorganised around identity, platform security and infrastructure resilience.
  • Implementation Examples added for each Subcategory as online resources.
  • Profiles expanded, including Community Profiles, with templates and Quick Start Guides published separately.
  • Informative References moved online and mapped through the NIST reference tool, so mappings can be updated without a new framework version.

Using it well

  1. Scope. Decide whether the profile covers the organisation, a business unit or a system.
  2. Current Profile. For each relevant Subcategory, record what is achieved and the evidence.
  3. Target Profile. Select and prioritise outcomes against business objectives and risk appetite, or start from a relevant Community Profile.
  4. Gap analysis and action plan. Cost and sequence the gap; assign owners.
  5. Report. Use Functions and Categories for board reporting, Subcategories for operational tracking.

Evidence expected

Where CSF is used for external assurance, expect reviewers to ask for: the documented Current and Target Profiles and their date; the method used to judge each Subcategory; evidence for a sample of Subcategories (for example access reviews for PR.AA, logging coverage for DE.CM, exercise records for RS.MA); and the action plan with progress.

Common mistakes

Common mistakes

  • Treating Subcategories as controls to be "implemented", rather than outcomes achieved by whatever controls fit.
  • Scoring every Subcategory without first agreeing a Target Profile, which turns a prioritisation tool into a compliance checklist.
  • Claiming certification or compliance. Neither exists for the CSF.
  • Mapping to CSF 1.1 identifiers in new work; 2.0 renumbered and restructured the Core.

Relationship to other frameworks

The CSF is often used as the reporting layer over a control set such as ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A, NIST SP 800-53 or the CIS Controls. In the UK, the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework covers similar ground with an assessment method attached. For control level mappings, use the NIST Informative References or OpenCRE.

Sources

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