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Cyber Governance Code of Practice

4 min read

The UK government's code for boards and directors, setting out what they should do to govern cyber risk, separate from the day to day management of security.

At a glance

Owner
DSIT and NCSC (published with DCMS)
Version
April 2025
Published
8 Apr 2025
Applies to
Boards and directors of medium and large public and private organisations; small organisations may use it, especially those in digital supply chains
Mandatory
Voluntary
Assessed by
Not assessed; boards apply it themselves, often through internal audit
Cost model
Free, including the supporting toolkit and training

Key points

  • Published on 8 April 2025 for boards and directors, not for the people who run security day to day.
  • Five principles: risk management; strategy; people; incident planning, response and recovery; and assurance and oversight. Each has between four and five actions, 22 in all.
  • Most actions ask the board to gain assurance rather than to do the work itself. Two set specific cadences: incident plans exercised at least annually, and formal cyber reporting to the board at least quarterly.
  • It is voluntary. It gives security leaders a government endorsed basis for what they ask of their board.
  • Free NCSC training (five modules of about 20 minutes each) and the Cyber Security Toolkit for Boards support it.

What it is

The Code sets out the minimum the government expects of directors in governing cyber risk. It was developed by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology with the NCSC, after consultation and a pilot with organisations, and is published on GOV.UK alongside a one page summary and mappings to other standards, including the CAF.

It deliberately avoids technical controls. The board's job is to make sure cyber risk is owned, resourced, reported and tested, and to hold executives to account. How the controls work is for the security function and frameworks such as the CAF, ISO/IEC 27001 and the CIS Controls.

The principles and actions

The actions below are summarised. Read the Code itself for the exact wording.

  • A. Risk management
    • A.1Critical technology, processes, information and services are identified, prioritised and agreed.
    • A.2Cyber risks have a senior owner and are part of enterprise risk management and internal controls.
    • A.3The board defines and communicates cyber risk appetite, with a plan to stay within it.
    • A.4Supplier and partner cyber risk is assessed in proportion to risk, and the organisation is resilient to it.
    • A.5Risk assessments are repeated regularly and reflect changes in the business, technology, regulation and threat.
  • B. Strategy
    • B.1A cyber strategy exists and is embedded in the wider organisational strategy.
    • B.2The strategy fits the risk appetite, meets regulatory obligations and anticipates change.
    • B.3Resources are allocated effectively to manage the agreed risks.
    • B.4The strategy is being delivered and achieving its intended outcomes.
  • C. People
    • C.1The board promotes a security culture of positive behaviour and accountability at every level.
    • C.2Clear policies support that culture.
    • C.3Directors train to build their own cyber literacy and take responsibility for the data and systems they use.
    • C.4An effective training, education and awareness programme is in place, shown by suitable metrics.
  • D. Incident planning, response and recovery
    • D.1A plan exists to respond to and recover from incidents affecting critical services.
    • D.2The plan is exercised at least annually with internal and external stakeholders, and lessons feed back into the plan and risk assessments.
    • D.3During an incident, directors meet their own regulatory obligations, including reporting, and support critical decisions and external communications.
    • D.4Post incident reviews feed lessons into risk assessments, plans and exercises.
  • E. Assurance and oversight
    • E.1A cyber governance structure is embedded in wider governance, with clear executive and non executive ownership.
    • E.2The board receives formal reporting at least quarterly, with agreed metrics and tolerances.
    • E.3The board has regular two way dialogue with senior executives, including the CISO or equivalent.
    • E.4Cyber security is built into existing internal and external audit and assurance.
    • E.5Senior executives know the relevant regulatory obligations and good practice in other codes.

The actions reference each other. Risk appetite (A.3) drives strategy (B.2), reporting tolerances (E.2) and resourcing (B.3). Exercises (D.2) and post incident reviews (D.4) feed back into risk assessment (A.5).

What it means for the security function

The Code is written for the board, but most of its evidence comes from the head of security. It is most useful as a structure for board engagement.

Practitioner note

Map your quarterly board report to principle E.2 and your risk register to A.2 and A.3. Then show the board, action by action, where it can and cannot currently gain assurance. That turns the Code from a reading list into a short gap analysis the board owns. If the board has never formally agreed a cyber risk appetite (A.3), start there: almost every other action depends on it.

Evidence expected

Evidence a board can point to: minutes recording agreement of critical services (A.1) and risk appetite (A.3); a cyber strategy approved at board level (B.1); a training record for each director (C.3); an incident plan and the report from the last exercise, with directors taking part (D.1, D.2); a quarterly cyber report with agreed metrics and tolerances (E.2); terms of reference naming the executive and non executive owners (E.1); and internal audit plans that include cyber (E.4).

Supporting material

  • NCSC Cyber Governance Training. Free, for directors and particularly non executives. An introduction plus five interactive modules, one per principle, of about 20 minutes each. Each includes a short scenario video and a printable summary. Organisations can embed it in their own learning platform under a simple licence.
  • NCSC Cyber Security Toolkit for Boards. Guidance and questions for boards on each area of the Code.
  • Standards mappings. Published on GOV.UK, linking the Code's actions to standards including the CAF.

Relationship to other frameworks and law

The Code does not replace any legal duty. Directors' general duties under the Companies Act 2006, UK GDPR accountability and, for regulated entities, the NIS Regulations already apply. The Code describes how a board can show it is meeting them for cyber risk.

It sits above control frameworks. The CAF's A1 Governance principle covers similar ground from the assessor's side. NIST CSF 2.0's Govern function covers the organisational side, and ISO/IEC 27001 clause 5 sets leadership requirements for an ISMS. An organisation already meeting those will find the Code adds little new work, but it gives the board one short document that says what it is responsible for.

Common gaps

Common nonconformity

  • Cyber appears on the risk register but no board member owns it, and the board has never agreed an appetite.
  • Board reporting is a list of activity (patches applied, phishing emails blocked) with no metrics tied to tolerances.
  • Incident plans are exercised by IT alone, so directors meet their reporting and communications duties for the first time during a real incident.
  • Directors have had no cyber training since joining the board.
  • Supplier risk is handled at procurement and never revisited.
  • Internal audit excludes cyber because it is seen as too technical.

Sources

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