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Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)

3 min read

Reference summary, not legal advice. Check the current legislation and take advice for your circumstances.

The EU regulation that sets ICT risk, incident, testing and third party requirements for financial entities, and brings critical ICT providers under EU oversight.

At a glance

Owner
European Union; supervised by national competent authorities and the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA)
Version
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and its regulatory and implementing technical standards
Published
17 Jan 2025
Applies to
Around 20 types of EU financial entity, including banks, insurers, investment firms, payment and e money institutions and crypto asset service providers, and critical ICT third party providers designated by the ESAs
Mandatory
Mandatory and directly applicable in every EU member state from 17 January 2025
Assessed by
National competent authorities; the ESAs for critical ICT third party providers
Cost model
Not applicable

Key points

  • DORA is a regulation, so it applies directly in every member state. It has applied since 17 January 2025.
  • It has five pillars: ICT risk management, ICT related incident management and reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third party risk management, and information sharing.
  • Major ICT related incidents need an initial notification within 4 hours of classification as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware, an intermediate report within 72 hours, and a final report within one month.
  • Financial entities must keep a register of information on all ICT third party arrangements.
  • The ESAs designated the first critical ICT third party providers on 18 November 2025, bringing them under direct EU oversight.

What it is

DORA harmonises operational resilience requirements for the EU financial sector, which previously sat across sector specific rules. For financial entities in its scope it is the lex specialis: where DORA applies, it takes precedence over NIS2's cyber risk and reporting requirements.

Detailed requirements are set in regulatory technical standards (RTS) and implementing technical standards (ITS), covering among other things the ICT risk management framework, incident classification and reporting templates, the register of information, threat led penetration testing and subcontracting.

The five pillars

  • ICT risk management (Articles 5 to 16)

    An ICT risk management framework approved and overseen by the management body, covering identification, protection, detection, response and recovery, backup policies, learning and communication. A simplified framework applies to some smaller entities.

  • ICT related incident management, classification and reporting (Articles 17 to 23)

    A defined process to detect, classify and report incidents, using criteria in the RTS; mandatory reporting of major incidents and voluntary notification of significant cyber threats.

  • Digital operational resilience testing (Articles 24 to 27)

    A risk based testing programme for all entities, and threat led penetration testing (TLPT) at least every three years for entities identified by their authority.

  • ICT third party risk management (Articles 28 to 44)

    A strategy for ICT third party risk, a register of information on all contractual arrangements, mandatory contract provisions (with additional terms for services supporting critical or important functions), exit strategies, and the oversight framework for critical ICT third party providers.

  • Information sharing (Article 45)

    Voluntary arrangements to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence.

Incident reporting

ReportDeadline
Initial notificationWithin 4 hours of classifying the incident as major, and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it; if classification comes later, within 4 hours of classification
Intermediate reportWithin 72 hours of the initial notification
Final reportWithin one month of the latest intermediate report

Classification uses criteria including clients and counterparts affected, duration and downtime, geographical spread, data losses, criticality of services affected and economic impact.

Critical ICT third party providers

The ESAs can designate ICT providers as critical based on their systemic importance to the financial sector. On 18 November 2025 they published the first list. Designated providers are overseen by a Lead Overseer, which can request information, carry out inspections and issue recommendations. Financial entities may only use a designated critical provider established outside the EU if it sets up an EU subsidiary within 12 months of designation.

What it means for UK organisations

DORA is not UK law. It applies to UK groups through their EU regulated financial entities, and to UK ICT providers through contracts with EU financial entities, which must contain DORA's mandatory provisions.

The UK has its own regime: the PRA and FCA operational resilience rules, which required firms to remain within impact tolerances for important business services by 31 March 2025, and the critical third parties regime under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

Practitioner note

For UK suppliers to EU banks and insurers, the practical impact arrives as contract changes: audit and access rights, incident notification, participation in TLPT, subcontracting controls and exit support. Review these clauses against what you can actually deliver before signing, particularly incident notification timings that need to fit inside your customer's 4 hour clock.

Common gaps

Common nonconformity

  • Register of information incomplete, especially for intra group ICT services and subcontractors supporting critical or important functions.
  • Incident classification run as a manual judgement with no time stamped decision, so the 4 hour clock cannot be evidenced.
  • Contracts not remediated with the mandatory Article 30 provisions.
  • Exit strategies documented but never tested for feasibility.
  • Management body approval of the ICT risk framework without evidence of ongoing oversight.

Sources

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