At a glance
- Owner
- UK Parliament; prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service
- Version
- Computer Misuse Act 1990, as amended
- Published
- 29 Jun 1990
- Applies to
- Everyone; offences with a significant link to the UK are within jurisdiction
- Mandatory
- Criminal law
- Assessed by
- Police investigation and criminal prosecution
- Cost model
- Not applicable
Key points
- Accessing a computer without authorisation is an offence under section 1, regardless of intent to cause harm.
- Authorisation is the dividing line between a penetration test and a crime. It must come from someone entitled to control access to the system.
- The most serious offence, section 3ZA, carries up to 14 years, or life imprisonment where the act causes or creates a significant risk of serious loss of life, illness or injury, or serious damage to national security.
- There is currently no statutory defence for good faith security research. The King's Speech of 13 May 2026 committed to updating the Act, and later reporting indicated any defence would be narrow; no change is yet law.
- Retaliatory "hack back" against an attacker's infrastructure is unauthorised access and is unlawful.
The offences
- Section 1 Unauthorised access to computer material
Causing a computer to perform any function with intent to secure unauthorised access, knowing it is unauthorised. Maximum two years.
- Section 2 Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate further offences
Maximum five years.
- Section 3 Unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, the operation of a computer
Covers malware, ransomware and denial of service. Maximum ten years.
- Section 3ZA Unauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious damage
To human welfare, the environment, the economy or national security. Maximum 14 years, or life where the act causes or creates a significant risk of serious loss of life, illness or injury, or serious damage to national security.
- Section 3A Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offences
Covers tools where the person intends, or believes it likely, they will be used to commit an offence. Maximum two years.
Section 4 and section 5 give the courts jurisdiction where there is a significant link to the UK, such as the accused or the target computer being in the UK.
What it means for a security function
Penetration testing and red teaming. A written authorisation from someone with authority over the systems, stating scope, dates, techniques and the testers, is what makes the activity lawful. Third party infrastructure needs its owner's authorisation too: a cloud provider's or managed service provider's terms may permit or restrict testing.
Scanning. Section 1 requires intent to secure access, so passive collection of public information is generally outside it. Active probing that seeks to gain access, such as testing credentials or exploiting a vulnerability, is not.
Threat intelligence and incident response. Logging in to an attacker's command and control server, or using leaked credentials to access a third party's system to confirm a compromise, is unauthorised access even when the purpose is defensive.
Security tools. Owning and using testing tools is lawful; section 3A turns on intent and belief about their use, so record the legitimate purpose for which tools are held.
Practitioner note
Get the authorisation chain right before any test, not after. The letter should be signed by someone who can actually authorise access to every system in scope, should name the testing organisation and individuals, and should include an emergency contact and stop procedure. For outsourced or cloud hosted systems, confirm the provider's testing policy in writing. Testers who stray outside the authorised scope lose the protection for the out of scope activity.
Reform
The Act predates the modern internet and has long been criticised for criminalising good faith research. The King's Speech of 13 May 2026 committed the government to updating the Act and to better enabling cyber security professionals to secure systems. Reporting in May 2026 indicated that a proposed statutory defence would be narrow: limited to scanning internet facing systems, requiring researchers to stop on discovering a vulnerability, and restricted to accredited individuals. The proposals remain under development and are not law.
Note
Until a defence is enacted, security researchers rely on prosecutorial discretion. The Crown Prosecution Service's legal guidance sets out how it approaches public interest decisions in Computer Misuse Act cases.
Common mistakes
Common nonconformity
- Test authorisation signed by an IT manager who does not control all systems in scope, such as supplier managed or cloud hosted assets.
- Scope creep during a test, for example pivoting to a subsidiary's network that was not named.
- Incident responders accessing an attacker's infrastructure or a third party's systems to gather evidence.
- Bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure programmes without published rules of engagement, leaving researchers and the organisation unsure what is authorised.
Sources
- legislation.gov.uk. Computer Misuse Act 1990 (opens in a new tab)
- Crown Prosecution Service. Computer Misuse Act legal guidance (opens in a new tab)
- The Record. UK plans for cybercrime law reform would protect almost no one, experts warn (opens in a new tab)