At a glance
- Owner
- StratQuad
- Version
- November 2026
- Applies to
- Windows Server and Windows client, Active Directory
- Mandatory
- Reference
Key points
- Most of these events are only written if the matching advanced audit policy subcategory is enabled. Check audit policy before relying on an absence of events.
- Security log events below are in the Security channel unless stated.
- Logon type in 4624 and 4625 is often the most useful field: it separates interactive, network, service and remote desktop sign ins.
- Clearing the Security log (1102) is itself logged and is a strong indicator of tampering.
Logon and authentication
| Event ID | Meaning | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 4624 | An account successfully logged on | Check Logon Type and source address |
| 4625 | An account failed to log on | Status and Sub Status codes give the reason |
| 4634 / 4647 | Logoff / user initiated logoff | Pair with 4624 by Logon ID for session length |
| 4648 | Logon attempted with explicit credentials | Common with runas and some lateral movement |
| 4672 | Special privileges assigned to new logon | Administrator equivalent sign ins |
| 4768 | Kerberos ticket granting ticket requested | On domain controllers |
| 4769 | Kerberos service ticket requested | RC4 encryption (0x17) requests are worth reviewing for Kerberoasting |
| 4771 | Kerberos pre authentication failed | Password spraying against Kerberos |
| 4776 | Domain controller attempted to validate credentials (NTLM) | NTLM authentication; logged on the computer holding the account, so local accounts appear on member hosts |
Logon types (4624 and 4625)
| Type | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 2 | Interactive (at the console) |
| 3 | Network (for example SMB file access) |
| 4 | Batch (scheduled task) |
| 5 | Service |
| 7 | Unlock |
| 8 | Network cleartext |
| 9 | New credentials (runas /netonly) |
| 10 | Remote interactive (Remote Desktop) |
| 11 | Cached interactive |
Accounts and groups
| Event ID | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 4720 | A user account was created |
| 4722 / 4725 | A user account was enabled / disabled |
| 4723 / 4724 | Password change attempt / password reset attempt |
| 4726 | A user account was deleted |
| 4728 / 4732 / 4756 | Member added to a global / local / universal security group |
| 4738 | A user account was changed |
| 4740 | A user account was locked out |
| 4767 | A user account was unlocked |
Persistence and execution
| Event ID | Channel | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 4688 | Security | A new process was created (enable command line logging to capture arguments) |
| 4697 | Security | A service was installed on the system |
| 7045 | System | A new service was installed |
| 4698 / 4702 | Security | A scheduled task was created / updated |
| 4104 | Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational | PowerShell script block logging |
Tampering and policy
| Event ID | Channel | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 1102 | Security | The audit log was cleared |
| 104 | System | An event log was cleared |
| 4719 | Security | System audit policy was changed |
| 4657 | Security | A registry value was modified (requires auditing on the key) |
Practitioner note
On endpoints with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or Sysmon, process, network and registry telemetry from those tools is richer than 4688 and 4657. Keep the Windows events anyway: they are what remains on servers without an agent, and they are what investigators ask for first.