At a glance
- Owner
- Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute; CISA publishes its own decision tree
- Version
- CISA SSVC Guide (November 2022)
- Published
- 10 Nov 2022
- Applies to
- Organisations that need a defensible, repeatable way to decide remediation urgency
- Mandatory
- Voluntary
- Assessed by
- The organisation applies the tree to each vulnerability
- Cost model
- Free to use
Key points
- SSVC replaces a numeric score with a decision: Track, Track*, Attend or Act.
- CISA's tree uses five decision points: Exploitation, Technical Impact, Automatable, Mission Prevalence and Public Well-being Impact.
- It was created by Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute in 2019; CISA developed its customised tree with the SEI in 2020 and published its guide in November 2022.
- The decision depends on the organisation applying it, which is the point: the same vulnerability can be Act for one organisation and Track for another.
What it is
SSVC asks a short sequence of questions about a vulnerability and the organisation's use of the affected product, and walks a decision tree to a recommended action. It is designed to be explainable: anyone can see which answers led to the decision, which a CVSS number alone does not provide.
CISA's decision points
- Exploitation
None (no evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept); Public PoC (a typical public exploit or well known method exists); Active (reliable evidence of exploitation in the wild)
- Technical Impact
Partial (limited control or information exposure, including denial of service); Total (full control of the software or full disclosure of system information)
- Automatable
No; Yes (reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery and exploitation can all be reliably automated)
- Mission Prevalence
Minimal; Support (supports mission essential functions); Essential (directly provides at least one mission essential function)
- Public Well-being Impact
Minimal; Material (serious physical, environmental, financial or psychological harm, such as injuries or safety hazards); Irreversible (the most severe harm, such as likely multiple fatalities or destabilised social systems)
- Mission and Well-being (derived)
Low, Medium or High, combined from Mission Prevalence and Public Well-being Impact
Decision outcomes
| Decision | Meaning | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| Track | No action required now; monitor and reassess if information changes | Within standard update timelines |
| Track* | Specific characteristics warrant closer monitoring for changes | Within standard update timelines |
| Attend | Requires supervisory attention; may involve requesting assistance and internal or external notification | Sooner than standard timelines |
| Act | Requires supervisory and leadership attention; internal groups meet to decide the response | As soon as possible |
Using it well
Practitioner note
SSVC works best as the policy that sits above your data sources. Exploitation comes straight from KEV and threat reporting, with EPSS as an early warning for Public PoC. Technical Impact comes from the CVSS vector. Automatable can be read from CVSS v4.0's supplemental metric where the publisher supplies it. Mission Prevalence and Well-being come from your own asset register, which is where most organisations find the gap. Define your standard timelines for Track, Attend and Act in writing before adopting the tree, otherwise the decisions have nothing to anchor to.
Note
CISA's tree reflects a national coordinator's view, with public well-being as a decision point. The SEI's documentation includes trees for other roles, such as suppliers and deployers, and supports building a custom tree. A UK organisation may reasonably adapt the decision points, provided the adaptation is documented.
Limitations
Limitations
- Decisions are only as good as the asset data behind Mission Prevalence; without a maintained register, teams default every asset to Essential, which places every vulnerability in the High Mission and Well-being column and pushes decisions towards Attend and Act.
- Four outcomes are coarse for very large backlogs; many teams sort within each outcome by EPSS or asset exposure.
- Exploitation status changes, so decisions must be recalculated when KEV or threat reporting updates.
Sources
- CISA. Stakeholder Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) (opens in a new tab)
- CISA. CISA SSVC Guide (opens in a new tab)
- CERT/CC, Carnegie Mellon University. SSVC documentation (opens in a new tab)